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The present paper analyzes the choices faced by European employers when threatened with the 
prospect of the mass lay-off of their employees as a result of the Great Recession. By means of a 
representative survey among employers in Italy, Germany, Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands 
and Sweden in 2009, we show that employers mainly prefer to tackle such threats by offering 
short-time work, and by early retirement packages to older workers, in conjunction with buy-outs. 
The latter preference is particularly visible in countries where employers perceive the level of 
employment protection to be high. The only notable exception is Denmark, where employers 
prefer to reduce working hours. In general, a sense of g nerational fairness influences 
downsizing preferences, with those employers who fav r younger workers particularly likely to 
use early retirement and buy-outs when downsizing, followed by working time reductions. Wage 
reductions and administrative dismissal are less favored by European employers. In particular, 
CEOs and owners are more inclined than lower-level managers to cut wages.  
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Drastic measures, such as downsizing, outsourcing, firing workers and cutting back on pension 
benefits are among the array of decisions contemplated nd taken when managers formulate 
strategies to survive economic crises. However, one key question is how firms balance their 
various interests with those of their workers. For example, in extreme cases do they prefer to 
downsize or do they use all available means to avoid this course of action? Information on how 
choices are made in times of crisis is scarce, because studies tend to focus on ‘normal’ economic 
conditions, when any economic volatility lies within certain bounds. Under such stable 
conditions, any shocks can be faced by taking relativ ly minor or piecemeal action. However, 
during both the recent global financial crisis (the so-called Great Recession) and during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the shocks were severe and the adaptive policies of firms had to be 
radical if profitability was to be restored. In such times of uncertainty, the ‘animal spirits’ to 
which Keynes alluded may well dominate decisions to invest, downsize and/or lay off workers 
(see Akerlof and Shiller (2009)). 
In the present paper, we examine how employers respond to the need to take far-reaching 
cost-cutting measures and how they address the difficult question of whether to keep workers in 
anticipation of better times to come, or to lay them off. The traditional assumption in economics 
is that concepts of fairness are irrelevant in such a dilemma; we nevertheless believe that 
considerations of equity and efficiency must be paid attention to in understanding such decisions. 
The reason for expecting these considerations to beimportant is because the findings of 
experimental and survey research (Bewley (1999, 2005), Camerer and Malmendier (2007), 
Kahneman et al. (1986), Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) show fairness to be a dominant force in most 
economic matters. While this notion may seem unorthodox to some economists, it is widely 
accepted by those who combine the insights of the real world with textbook economics. As the 
labor economist Albert Rees once noted: 
 
“Beginning in the mid-1970s, I began to find myself in a series of roles in which I participated in setting or 
controlling wages and salaries. […] In none of those roles did I find the theory I had been teaching for so long to be 
of slightest help. The factors involved in setting wages and salaries in the real world seemed to be very different 
from those specified in the neoclassical theory. The one factor that seemed to be of overwhelming importance in all 




Unlike the writings of Rees, the present paper offers no perspective on wage 
determination, instead we focus on the role of fairness in considerations of the options of 
employers when faced with the prospect of downsizing. Further, we do not investigate the actual 
decision to lay workers off, but we rather focus on the options open to employers, and their 
preferences among such options, when managing a lare reorganization. Specifically, this paper 
focuses on the following three strategies in downsizi g: 
(1) Voluntary exit options (in particular, buy-outs and early retirement arrangements); 
(2) Rules of administrative dismissal (in particular, LIFO (last-in-first-out) and the 
dismissal rule of a balanced age structure, in which all age groups in the firm are equally hit by a 
downsizing operation); and 
(3) Indirect measures to prevent or reduce the extent of mass lay-offs, such as short-time 
working and wage cuts. 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to describe and shed light on the preferences from 
among these options across employers in a variety of European countries. Secondly, we aim to 
investigate systematically various antecedents for ch osing among dismissal options. We focus 
on two distinct elements, namely the sense of generational fairness and the perceived strictness 
of employment protection. Generational fairness is embodied in some of the rules and norms 
applied in the labor market (e.g., LIFO) that refer to common norms or explicit rules related to 
the application of fairness in order to minimize conflict. The notion that young workers ‘deserve 
a chance’ in times of economic downturns is a view that is widely held in society (OECD (2006), 
Munnell and Wu (2012)). Indeed, the findings of Kapteyn et al. (2010) and Kalwij et al. (2010) 
suggest that early retirement arrangements were designed and supported in the 1970s and 1980s 
in the Netherlands (when youth unemployment rates soared) to accommodate the feeling that 
young workers were not getting a fair chance. The same may be happening today, given that 
youth unemployment rates exceed those of older workers by a factor of two to four in most 
countries, and pressures are mounting to take corrective action, even though this course of action 
is known to be illusory as  the so-called ‘lump of labor’ fallacy suggests (Ilmakunnas et al. 
(2010), Munnell and Wu (2012)). An unresolved empirical question is therefore whether 
employers also have these perceptions of fairness, and whether generational fairness plays a 
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distinctive role in human resource strategies. We contribute to the literature by offering direct 
evidence of the role of fairness among employers in matters of downsizing.1  
The second element of focus is the strictness of employment protection rules. In most 
countries, there is some debate about whether to make employment protection less strict, with the 
model of Danish ‘flexicurity’ the leading example. In most studies of labor markets, employment 
protection is approximated in one of two ways. OECD indicators can be used to proxy the 
strictness of employment protection legislation in order to estimate macroeconomic effects 
(Venn, 2009), or a specific employment protection rule can be modeled  in dynamic general 
equilibrium models (see Bartelsman et al. 2010) to derive the direct and indirect allocation 
effects on the labor market. Although both methods have advantages, we complement the 
insights provided by current approaches by offering direct evidence of the perceptions of 
employers about the strictness of employment protecti n in order to estimate the possible effects 
on human resource strategies. 
The third aim of the present study is to gain a deeper understanding of the various 
cultures in which organizations operate. By studying dismissal policy choices in a representative 
sample of organizations in six European countries in 2009 (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland, 
the Netherlands and Italy), our dataset contains a variety of different work and welfare state 
cultures. To our knowledge, no studies have provided data on employer behavior on such a large 
scale across such diverse policy contexts. In addition, we explore how employment protection 
determines the manner in which downsizing is effected. Compared with previous findings on this 
topic, the pooling of these diverse experiences provides more robust and clearer perspectives on 
how employers may react to the threat of downsizing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of 
the dilemmas which employers face when they face the threat of downsizing. Section 3 shortly 
describes the methods and data used to test hypotheses concerning downsizing preferences. And 
the central part of the paper will be section 4 where r sults are presented and discussed. Section 5 
concludes this paper. 
 
                                                          
1
 However, today’s circumstances are different from those of the 1970s and 1980s when countries were enjoying the 
demographic dividend of a growing population. Today, the demographic dividend may be thought of as a 
demographic hangover because the growth of the potential workforce has petered out. In addition to the 
demographic context, the Great Recession of today makes the considerations of downsizing not a fictional choice 




2. DILEMMAS WHEN DOWNSIZING 
The Great Recession poses fundamental dilemmas for firms because large and negative shocks in 
demand necessitate a shifting of gears (often manifested as organizational readjustment and 
downsizing). Although in practice downsizing entails more than simply laying people off, we 
focus exclusively on so-called employee downsizing, which is a planned set of organizational 
policies and practices aimed at reducing the workforce with the goal of improving the 
performance of a firm (Datta et al. (2010)). Although the economic rationale of downsizing 
sounds plausible, the outcomes of such policies are ambiguous (for a review of the effects of 
downsizing, see Datta et al. (2010)). The costs of mass lay-offs are not always outweighed by the 
expected benefits in terms of higher profits and productivity. While such advantages may be the 
driving force for deciding to restructure, the associated costs can be large and take a variety of 
forms. Cascio (2010) lists the following direct and i irect costs of lay-offs: severance pay; 
paying out accrued vacation and sick pay; outplacement costs; higher unemployment-insurance 
taxes; the cost of rehiring employees when business improves; low morale and a tendency for 
survivors to be risk-averse; potential lawsuits, sabot ge, or even workplace violence from 
aggrieved employees or former employees; loss of institutional memory and knowledge; 
diminished trust in management; and reduced productivity. 
 As mentioned in the Introduction, one particular dilemma is central in public debates, 
namely the fair treatment of younger workers. The reason for focusing on this specific issue is 
that this dilemma brings together issues of equity and efficiency. When deciding whether to lay 
younger employees off, generational fairness is expected to play a role in addition to 
considerations of profitability. Youth unemployment ra es have soared since the onset of the 
Great Recession in 2008, with rates surpassing 50% in countries such as Greece and Spain. The 
youth unemployment rates (among those aged 15–24 years) and ratio of the youth 
unemployment rates to those of older workers are presented in Figure 1a and Figure 1b, 
respectively. These figures suggest that youth unemployment in Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands has remained relatively low, whereas tht in Sweden and particularly in Poland and 
Italy is now high and volatile. The burden of the crisis is, however, not exclusively confined to 
younger workers. Middle aged and older workers alsofeel the effects of a contraction in 
economic activity. Figure 1b highlights the potential intergenerational tension in this regard. In 
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particular in Italy and Sweden, where the unemployment ratio between young and older workers 
has fluctuated between 4 and 8 for the past decade, one would expect considerations of 
generational equity to enter the minds of employers. 
 
Figure 1a: Youth Unemployment Rates (15–24 age group) in European countries: 














Figure 1b: Ratio of Youth Unemployment Rates (15–24 years) to Older Unemployment 






In Europe, the Great Recession could not have occurred at a more inconvenient moment. 
Financial turbulence struck a number of European countries just as they were beginning to 
implement pension reforms aimed at counteracting the effects of having an aging population. 
These reforms include higher ages of retirement and a move to actuarially fair pensions, as well 
as the transition from defined benefit pension contracts to defined contribution contracts. Overall, 
the implied changes in income (and subsequently lower pension benefits, see Coile and Levine 
(2009)) as well as the institutional design changes carried out by governments - such as 
increasing the retirement age (in the case of the Netherlands, from 65 to 67) - have led workers 
to adapt their retirement plans and extend their working lives. In the eyes of the public, therefore, 
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the short-term and long-term concerns are conflicting: longer careers may well come at the 
expense of providing career opportunities to younger workers. The solution cherished by 
policymakers and the public is thus to replace older workers with younger ones. However, 
evidence that age groups can easily be substituted is virtually absent (Kalwij et al. (2010)) and at 
the macroeconomic level, later retirement does not seem to adversely influence the employment 
of young workers. 
This idea of substitution formed the premise on which early retirement programs were 
designed in the late 1970s and 1980s. Early retirement arrangements were established in the 
belief that decreasing the labor participation of older workers would create opportunities for 
young unemployed people. Studies that have assessed thi  substitution of old workers for young 
ones, however, are unanimous in their findings. At the macro level, such measures fall prone to 
the ‘lump of labor’ fallacy; in other words, the literature refutes the idea that there is a fixed 
amount of work in the economy, which can be split up and allocated across workers.  
 
Figure 2: Relationship between changes (in percentage points) in youth (15–24 years) and 






Nevertheless, the practice of offering early retirement is still common, as the OECD 
(2006) show in their review of the policies aimed at working longer. The idea of redistributing 
work – and offering the option of early retirement – is especially prominent in times of recession 
and high (youth) unemployment. Indeed, a glance at the most recent data on the unemployment 
rates of younger and older workers shows that both trends move in tandem and that policies 
facilitating a substitution of old for young workers do not affect macroeconomic labor market 
figures (Figure 2). 
A complicating factor in the day-to-day HR practices of organizations is the question of 
employment protection. Older workers are generally well protected in most countries (OECD 
(2006)) by virtue of their length of employment with the company, whereas young workers are 
still working their way up the firm’s hierarchy. Moreover, although some employment protection 
comprises part of the remuneration packages offered to mployees (Pissarides (2010)), general 
protection tends to be offered at a sectoral or natio l level in most western countries, and is 
often enforced by the state (OECD (2010), Venn (2009)). 
Nonetheless, the simple fact that older workers have more protection rights than young 
ones complicates the options available to an employer who wishes to be fair. An employer who 
downsizes and abruptly lays employees off is seen to be violating an implicit contract, a set of 
mutual obligations that link employer and employee. Such a breach of contract could have 
repercussions not only for those whose contracts are nullified but also for those who survive. 
Survivors may lose their trust in their principal, display less commitment, withhold effort or 
increase absence (De Meuse et al. (2004)), which can all have negative economic consequences 
(cf. Shah (2000)). These real-life repercussions make issues of fairness or procedural justice a 
topic of some importance for CEOs and owner-directors. In order to minimize disruptions to 
business operations, employers who perceive the realistic repercussions of downsizing pay close 
attention to the fairness of the processes used to arrive at major organizational decisions 
(Hegtvedt and Markovsky (1995)). Employees will judge as fair those processes that provide for 
“consistency across individuals and time, are free of bias, incorporate and reflect the opinions of 
people affected, and conform to the moral and ethical standards” (Leventhal et al. (1980)). In this 
respect, it is understandable why in most western countries the rules of employment protection 
agreed by all parties are followed closely in matters of downsizing. 
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 The foregoing considerations make fairness and the perceived restrictions on dismissing 
workers the central focus of our paper. To make our c nsiderations explicit, we focus on the 
following two hypotheses, both of which are central o the dilemmas faced by employers who 
face the threat of downsizing: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
The more employment protection rules are perceived to be strict, the more employers opt for (1) 
measures (wage cuts, short-time work) that alleviat the size of the employee downsizing 




Employers who think it is fair for older workers to step aside to provide younger workers a 
chance in matters of downsizing (1) do not favor employment protection rules directed at older 
workers (such as LIFO) and (2) prefer to dismiss older workers through early retirement 
arrangements or a buy-out. 
 
3. METHODS AND DATA  
3.1 Data Collection 
Data on employers’ behaviors and attitudes were coll ted between March and November 2009. 
The countries included in this study were geographically dispersed throughout Europe and 
represented all types of European welfare state. We used data from comparative surveys carried 
out among employers in Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden (Conen 
et al. (2012)). By employers, we mean the key decision makers in a selected business unit of an 
organization. In some cases, the business unit and organization were the same entity; however, 
the former could also refer to a subsidiary of a firm that operated at a national or international 
level. 
The response rates of the survey for the sample countries were 11% (Germany), 17% 
(Italy), 23% (Netherlands), 23% (Poland), 28% (Denmark) and 53% (Sweden). These rates were 
lower than the average response rates for individual surveys but were in line with the rates 
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generally found in corporate surveys. In Europe and the United States, for instance, response 
rates have been found to be 20 to 30% at most (Brewster et al. (1994), Kalleberg et al. (1996), 
Van Dalen et al. (2009, 2010)).2 For all countries, we drew a stratified sample of the 
characteristics of the sectors and sizes of the invstigated business units.3 
 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
The central survey question on which we base our findings was as follows: “Suppose, under the 
current economic conditions, your organization is forced to downsize 20% of your staff. Which 
of the following policy measures would you favor?” The six options offered were: 
(1) Dismissals based on the LIFO principle 
(2) Dismissals based on the representative age structure of the organization 
(3) Early retirement of older employees 
(4) Buy-outs to facilitate voluntary exits 
(5) Short-time work 
(6) Reduction of wages for all employees 
The answer options were: (1) strongly against; (2) against; (3) no opinion; (4) in favor; ( 5 
strongly in favor. 
 
3.3 Central Explanatory Variables 
The central explanatory variables in this paper focus on the following two variables: 
                                                          
2
 Although the questionnaires used in the sample countries were identical, the interview techniques differed by 
country depending on what was perceived to be the best way to address respondents. Denmark used computer-
assisted web interviewing; Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden used paper-and-pencil surveys; and France, Italy 
and Poland conducted interviews using the computer-assisted telephone technique. 
3
 In the analyses at the national level, we weighted th  data afterwards to account for the sampling design ( ee 
Conen, 2013) in order to ensure all observations were representative of the population of employers. Weights were 
constructed according to the population of business unit  from national statistics bureaus and corrected for the 
sectors and sizes of business units. 
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• Generational fairness: “Younger workers should get preferential treatment in staying on 
when an organization has to downsize” (1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree) 
• Perceived strictness of employment protection: “How difficult is it for your organization 
to dismiss an employee who has a long tenure?” (1 = very easy to 5 = very difficult) 
 
Contrary to the majority of published macroeconomic research, which focuses on the de jure 
level of employment protection as measured by OECD (2010), the present study uses the level of 
employment protection as perceived by individual employers. There is some evidence that 
perceptions of regulations may be of importance for understanding actual organizational 
decisions. For instance, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) show t at small firms are often exempted from 
certain aspects of labor regulations or, when enforcement is weak, do not comply with legislation. 
In general, one would thus expect de jure regulations to influence labor demand. For example, 
the research by Pierre and Scarpetta (2006), who employ the World Bank’s Investment Climate 
Survey, shows that firms in developing countries that face stricter employment legislation are 
more likely to report that such regulations are a major obstacle to their business operations. 
However, these authors also show that larger and innovative firms tend to be more sensitive to 
the strictness of regulation. In short, the individual circumstances in which firms operate matter, 
because perceptions of the strictness of regulations may offer a better approximation of the ways 
in which the rules and regulations in a country function. 
 
3.4 Secondary Explanatory Variables 
We use a number of antecedents to provide additional nsights into the preferences of employers: 
• Percentage of highly skilled employees in the business unit 
• Percentage of part-timers in the business unit 
• Percentage of employees aged 50 years or older in the business unit 
• Influence of unions, as measured by the response to the item: “The influence of unions on 
personnel policies is clearly visible in our organizat on” (1 = completely disagree to 5 = 
completely agree) 
• Firm size, summarized by a dummy variable with three categories (small < 50 employees; 
middle-sized = between 20 and 250 employees; large = > 250 employees) 
• Industry sector: manufacturing = 0; services sector = 1; public sector = 2. 
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• Position of respondent in the organizational hierarchy (owner-director/CEO = 1, 
otherwise (i.e., manager, head of department, HR manager, miscellaneous administrative 
functions) = 0) 
• Age of respondent (in years) 
• Need to downsize, as measured by the response to thquestion: “To what extent does 
your organization face the need to downsize?” (none or hardly = 0; to some extent = 1; a 
high extent = 2) 
 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the subsequent analysis (see 
the appendix for the country-specific statistics). These sample characteristics suggest that the 
average employer is 46 years old and that 29% of the employers are owner-directors or 
CEOs/CFOs. Organizations are represented almost equally across size categories and industry 
sectors. Further, in the organizations surveyed, approximately 25% of staff are aged 50 years or 
older and almost the same percentage applies to thenumber of highly skilled employees. Finally, 
67% of the organizations surveyed barely perceived th  need to downsize, while 26% felt some 


















Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Independent variables: downsize optionsa   
 LIFO 2.51 1.12 
 Balanced age structure 2.81 1.02 
 Early retirement 3.56 0.96 
 Buy-out 3.32 1.05 
 Short-time work 3.46 0.99 
 Wage cuts 2.70 1.09 
Explanatory variables   
Generational fairnessa 2.82 0.96 
Perceived strictness EPLa 3.82 0.97 
Strength of unionsa 2.69 1.27 
   
% Part-timers in the business unit 0.18 0.23 
% Highly skilled employees in the business unit 0.25 0.29 
% Older workers (50+) in the business unit 0.25 0.17 
Size of the organization   
  Small 0.33 0.47 
  Middle 0.36 0.48 
  Large 0.30 0.46 
Sector   
  Manufacturing 0.38 0.48 
  Service sector 0.30 0.46 
  Public sector 0.33 0.47 
Need to downsize   
  None/hardly 0.67 0.47 
  To some extent 0.26 0.44 
  To a high extent 0.07 0.26 
Age of respondent (in years) 46.39 9.70 
CEO/owner-director (otherwise = 0) 0.29 0.45 
(a)  These variables are all based on a five-point scale.  






4.1 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
For the sample countries, Figure 3 summarizes the pref rences of European employers if their 
organizations faced the threat of downsizing. It isclear that early retirement, buy-outs and short-
time work are the dominant preferred options for managing downsizing across all sample 
countries. By contrast, cutting wages across the board is an unpopular option, although it would 
still be considered by a number of organizations in the Netherlands and Germany.  
Figure 3: Policy options for dealing with mass lay-offs across European employers, 2009 
 
Source: ASPA (2009), weighted figures 
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In our analysis we aim to establish which antecedents help explain these choices by 
focusing on generational fairness and the perceived strictness of employment protection. Tables 
2 and 3 rank generational fairness and the perceived difficulty of employment protection rules by 
level of employer agreement, respectively. 
 
Table 2: Generational fairness among employers, ranked by level of agreement 
 “Younger workers should get preferential treatment in staying on when 
an organization has to downsize.” 
 Agree No opinion Disagree 
Italy 50 14 36 
Sweden 36 30 34 
Poland 25 29 46 
Netherlands 24 20 56 
Germany 23 30 47 
Denmark 13 49 38 
Source: ASPA (2009), weighted figures 
 
Table 2 shows the diverse opinions of European employers with respect to the treatment 
of young and old workers in the case of downsizing. Italian employers clearly favor younger 
workers in times of crisis, while Swedish employers are more evenly divided across the various 
categories. However, employers in the other sample countries disagree that younger workers 
should receive preferential treatment. This disagreem nt may be a forceful explanation of the 
preference for early retirement, because such programs offer higher replacement rates than 
unemployment or welfare benefits. An additional insight offered by Table 2 is that the preference 
for younger workers over older ones is largely related to the state of the local labor market (see 
Figures 1a and 1b). For instance, youth unemployment in Italy is extremely high (approximately 
30%) and outranks the unemployment rate of older workers by a factor of 7 (in the 1990s, this 
was even a factor of 10). By contrast, Sweden, which also has a high level of youth 
18 
 
unemployment compared with the unemployment rate of older workers, displays a relatively 
high level of generational fairness towards the young. 
 
Table 3: Perceived strictness of employment protection, ranked by level of difficulty 
 Difficulty of dismissing an employee with a long tenure 
 (Very) easy Neither easy nor difficult (Very) difficult 
Italy 4 13 83 
Netherlands 3 27 70 
Sweden 3 35 62 
Germany 7 31 62 
Poland 14 49 37 
Denmark 28 46 26 
Source: ASPA (2009), weighted figures. 
 
With respect to the perceived strictness of employment protection, employers in Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Germany perceive these rules to be relatively strict. In each of these 
sample countries, the majority of employers state that it is (very) difficult to fire workers who 
have long tenures, whereas Polish and Danish employers are less certain about the complexity of 
firing a long-standing employee. These country-level perceptions are largely in line with the 
OECD’s official employment protection indicators (see OECD (2010), Venn (2009)). The only 
exception may be Italy. According to the OECD’s indicators for 2008, the protection of 
permanent workers against (individual) dismissal is registered as quite flexible; however, the 
Italian employers in our sample perceive individual dismissal as strictly regulated. This anomaly 
may be explained on the basis that employers interpret this question in a broad sense (i.e., 
19 
 
considering collective as well as individual dismissal ). Indeed, employment protection for the 
case of collective dismissals in Italy is one of the most restrictive in the OECD.4 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Although these cross-tabulations suggest a particular ranking of options for overcoming the 
dilemmas of downsizing, we use multivariate regression analysis to examine these driving forces 
in detail. Table 4 presents the ordered logit analysis of preferences for downsizing options. In 
this analysis, we distinguish between measures that facilitate employee downsizing (i.e., LIFO, 
balanced age structure, early retirement and buy-outs) and measures that aim to alleviate or 
mitigate the threat of downsizing by either cutting the wages of all employees or shortening 
working hours. We first examine the central hypotheses regarding the influence of generational 
fairness and the perceived strictness of employment protection on these downsizing options, and 
then discuss the most important antecedents that explain downsizing preferences. 
First, the estimation results suggest that Hypothesis 1 is partially supported by our 
empirical evidence. Whilst the perceived strictness of employment protection rules is not 
associated with a preference for wage cuts or short-time work, it does significantly explain the 
preference for voluntary exit routes, namely early retirement packages (in particular) and/or buy-
outs. By calculating the marginal effects (see Table 5), it becomes apparent how strong the 
driving force of these perceptions are. Almost half of employers (49%) who find it very easy to 
dismiss a worker would opt for early retirement as a downsizing measure compared with almost 
three-quarters (74%) of employers who find it very difficult to fire a worker. In other words, the 
likelihood that early retirement is chosen increases substantially as the level of employment 
protection is perceived to be stricter. 
Whilst the evidence for Hypothesis 1 is mixed, thisis not the case for Hypothesis 2. In 
other words, the empirical results are in line with the stated hypothesis. Columns (1) and (2) 
show that employers who favor younger workers do not support the use of the LIFO rule and 
prefer a more balanced age dismissal rule than employers who do not share this sense of fairness. 
                                                          
4
 For the various sample countries, we list here the OECD indicators on a scale of 0 (least) to 6 (most re rictions) 
for these two cases of dismissal: protection of permanent workers against individual dismissal (Ind). specific 
requirements for collective dismissal (Col): Netherlands (Ind: 2.73; Col: 3.00); Italy (Ind: 1.69; Col: 4.88); Denmark 
(Ind: 1.53; Col: 3.13); Sweden (Ind: 2.72; Col: 3.75); Poland (Ind: 2.01; Col: 3.63); Germany (Ind: 2.85; Col: 3.75). 
20 
 
Table 4: Ordered logistic analysis of the preference for using one of the downsizing options 
 Administrative dismissal rules Facilitating voluntary exit 
by means of: 




















-0,03 -0,01 0,27*** 0,15*** 0,03 0,02 
       
Strength unions 0,01 0,07*** 0,05* 0,01 -0,06** -0,09*** 
Percentage part-
timers 
0,32** -0,01 -0,10 0,09 0,24 0,07 
Percentage highly 
skilled 
-0,41** -0,28** -0,08 0,37*** -0.15 0,06 
Percentage workers 
50+ 
-0,29 0,31* 1.07*** 0,52*** -0,06 -0,24 
Size (small = 0)       
 Middle -0,10 0,20*** 0,27*** 0,53*** 0,08 0,03 
 Large -0,19** 0,40*** 0,44*** 0,91*** 0,16* 0,21*** 
Sector (Manufacturing 
= 0) 
      
 Services sector 0,02 -0,11 -0,17** 0,15* -0,27*** -0,02 
 Public sector -0,11 -0,14 -0,21** 0,07 -0,75*** -0,76*** 
Owner/CEO (other = 0) -0,48*** -0,22*** -0,27*** -0,42*** 0,03 0,42*** 
Age of respondent -0,00 -0,01* -0,01*** 0,00 -0,01** -0,01*** 
Need to downsize  
(low extent =0) 
      
 Some extent -0,01 -0,10 0,15* 0,11 -0,11 -0,03 
 High extent -0,01 0,23* 0,53*** 0,59*** 0,01 0,06 
       
Country  
(Netherlands = 0) 
      
 Italy 0,65*** -1,87*** -0,69*** -0,42* 0,07 -0,62*** 
 Denmark -0.77*** -1,20*** -1,34*** -0.99*** -0,02 -0,06 
 Sweden 0,21* -0.66*** -0,52*** -0,39*** -0,47*** -0,09 
 Poland 0,74*** -1,24*** -0,42*** -0,76*** -0,64*** -0,04 
 Germany 0,67*** -0,47*** -0,24** -0,66*** 0,05 0,58*** 
       
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 
 
Note: N = 3625; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; cut-off points are not presented for matters of brevity. 
 
 
With respect to the second part of Hypothesis 2, it is also clear that generational fairness 
affects the decisions of employers: those who favor younger workers tend to use early retirement 
programs and buy-outs to facilitate the exits of older workers than employers who do not. Finally, 
although the coefficients presented do not allow us to provide an exact impression of the driving 
force of generational fairness, the marginal effects presented in Table 5 seems to support this 
perspective for the options of early retirement andbuy-outs. 
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Table 5: Visualizing the marginal effects of generational fairness and the strictness of 
employment protection legislation on choosing early retirement or buy-outs (based on the 
estimation model in Table 4, evaluated at sample means) 
 Early retirement Strongly 
against 






Strongly disagree 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.46 0.06 
Disagree 0.04 0.14 0.21 0.53 0.09 
Neutral 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.55 0.11 
Agree 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.59 0.15 
Strongly agree 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.58 0.14 
 Buy-outs Strongly 
against 






Strongly disagree 0.06 0.21 0.23 0.45 0.05 
Disagree 0.05 0.19 0.22 0.48 0.06 
Neutral 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.50 0.06 
Agree 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.53 0.07 
Strongly agree 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.55 0.08 
 Early retirement Strongly 
against 







Very easy 0.06 0.19 0.26 0.44 0.05 
Easy 0.04 0.16 0.24 0.50 0.06 
Neither easy nor 
difficult 
0.03 0.13 0.22 0.55 0.07 
Difficult 0.03 0.10 0.19 0.59 0.10 
Very difficult 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.62 0.12 
 Buy-outs Strongly 
against 







Very easy 0.07 0.24 0.24 0.41 0.04 
Easy 0.06 0.21 0.23 0.44 0.05 
Neither easy nor 
difficult 
0.05 0.19 0.22 0.48 0.06 
Difficult 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.51 0.06 
Very difficult 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.53 0.07 
Note: rows sum to 1, with rounding errors. 
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The influence of generational fairness on downsizing preferences is therefore clear. 
Nonetheless, even those employers who strongly disagree with the preferential treatment of 
younger workers have a 52% likelihood of favoring early retirement as a downsizing option 
compared with 72% of employers who favor younger employees. In other words, a strong switch 
towards favoring younger workers implies that the lik lihood of so doing increases by 20 percent. 
While this strong driving force behind generational fairness is less visible in the use of buy-outs, 
this is largely understandable; buy-outs can also be used to facilitate the exits of younger workers, 
whereas early retirement is by definition restricted to older ones. 
With regard to the other antecedents, a number of other results are noteworthy. First, 
aging organizations5 (i.e., those with a high percentage of workers aged 50 years or older) show 
characteristics in line with the principles of generational fairness. An increase in the number of 
older workers is associated with a higher likelihood that the employer in question will prefer 
early retirement and buy-outs as exit routes. 
Second, firm size and industry sector seem to be significant. In particular, large 
organizations are more likely to downsize through early retirement arrangements and buy-outs 
than small ones, perhaps because they have larger financial reserves to facilitate such choices. 
Large organizations also show a preference for cutting wages across the board as an option to 
alleviate the effects of downsizing. The reason whysmaller firms tend not to resort to cutting 
wages may be found in the simple model of Weiss (1980), which shows that firms are in general 
averse to wage cutting and prefer to lay workers off, because the most talented employees with 
the best options will resign, thereby leading to adverse selection. In small organizations, 
production and profitability may depend on just a few ‘star’ workers; once they leave, the firm 
may unravel. One possible explanation of why large organizations do not entirely back away 
from cutting wages is that they may possess sufficient economies of scale to create an internal 
labor market, in which they are able to find suitable candidates if the most talented employees 
were to resign. 
                                                          
5
 The percentage of older workers may indeed capture the stylized effect measured by Autor and Dorn (2009) and 




The estimation results by industry sector also demonstrate the plausible outcome that 
public sector employers never cut wages and rarely reduce the working hours of their employees. 
This finding suggests that the labor contracts of civil servants, in terms of wages and hours, 
cannot be changed even in the worst of financial clmates, which may be the result of strong 
union bargaining.6 Notably, the explicit role of unions is present in he choices made by 
employers, judging from the strength that employers perceive unions to have, but the effects are 
not that great. Unions tend to be able to reinforce the balanced age rule of dismissal and prevent 
reductions in working hours and wages. However, our results do not show clearly why unions 
cannot influence the choices substantially for early retirement packages and buy-outs. By 
contrast, the work of Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2010) shows that strong unions lead to a higher 
likelihood of employees receiving severance pay.7 
Third, the sense of urgency to downsize as perceived by employers significantly 
influences their preferences. Those employers who feel that the need to downsize is real and 
present are more likely to choose early retirement and buy-out packages than employers who feel 
little such pressure to act, suggesting that the instincts of employers are to use early retirement 
benefits when the threat of downsizing is real. 
Fourth, the position within the organizational hierarchy affects how decisions over major 
reorganizations are made. CEOs and owner-directors are averse to downsizing options (e.g., 
early retirement, buy-outs or applying the LIFO rule) and attempt to alleviate the need to 
downsize by opting for wage cuts. This is a strong a d robust finding which suggests that 
distance from the top to the bottom may matter in making choices. Of course, it remains 
somewhat of a puzzle why hierarchy matters.  One reason could be that middle managers and 
supervisors, who are closer to employees, may be bett r able to assess how wage cuts would 
affect work morale or lead to negative repercussions (cf. Bewley (2005)). 
Finally, since the number of countries is too small to perform multilevel analyses (cf. 
Maas and Hox (2005)), in order to test for macro-leve  effects we controlled for country-specific 
                                                          
6
 Considering the fact that most public sector organiz tions are very large, it stands to reason that early retirement 
programs and buy-out packages are used to solve the downsizing puzzle. 
7
 Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2010) offer a complementary cross-sectional view (with the use of SHARE data) on the 
probability of retiring early with severance pay in a number of European countries. However, it should be noted that 
the setting – no need for mass lay-offs, no crisis conditions within a firm– and the focus on the employee having 
retired early is distinctly different, making further comparisons of research findings somewhat difficult. 
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characteristics by including country dummies, and found these effects to be large and significant. 
This result suggests that substantial variation cannot be captured by the structural variables 
included in the present regression analysis and that the institutional structure of a country is 
highly relevant. Danish employers, for example, are less likely to consider most alternatives to 
downsizing apart from short-time work and wage cuts. Further, with respect to short-time 
working, the influence of government programs in Italy and Germany is especially noticeable, 
where the take-up rate of these programs during the Great Recession has been substantial (Möller 
(2010), Hijzen and Venn (2011)). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
When a recession deepens, the instincts or ‘animal spirits’ of employers that were previously 
suppressed by prosperity or considered to be outdated may resurface. One such instinctive 
motive related to assisting a business in distress is encouraging older workers to take early 
retirement. Given the aging populations and unsustainable pension and social security systems of 
the developed world, an attitude common among western governments has been to reverse this 
early retirement trend and shift towards ‘active aging’, by encouraging workers to extend their 
careers substantially (Henkens and Schippers, 2012). However, our findings show that the Great 
Recession seems to have reactivated the instincts of employers. Specifically, we found that 
European employers predominantly resort to offering early retirement packages (and to a lesser 
extent buy-outs) in response to the threat of downsizing, and these preferences are even stronger 
among employers for whom the need for downsizing is already a fact of life. The only exception 
to this rule is the response of Danish employers, whose dominant preference to tackle this 
problem is by reducing the working hours of their employees. 
Understanding why employers resort to early retirement can be seen as a reflection of the 
degree of the generational fairness and strictness of the employment legislation perceived by 
employers. The use of generational fairness as an important factor of influence in times of crisis 
reminds us of the ‘animal spirits’ to which Keynes alluded in his General Theory (1936). Or, to 
rephrase this in the lingo favored by behavioral economists (cf. DellaVigna, 2009): it are the 
non-standard preferences and beliefs which matter in o ganizational decision making. Further, 
the perception of the strictness of employment protection is also clearly associated with selected 
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downsizing options: the more employers perceive these rules to be strict, the more they opt for 
buy-out routes and early retirement programs. One should however take note of the fact that, 
even those employers who display no generational bias towards younger or older workers or who 
do not find employment protection to be restrictive generally prefer early retirement and buy-
outs as downsizing solutions. Hence, there seems to be a clear and structural driving force for 
employers to choose these exit options. 
Besides the effects of generational fairness and the strictness of employment protection 
some firm-specific antecedents are also clearly associated with the preference of employers to 
offer early retirement packages as a downsizing strategy. Large and aging organizations are more 
likely to opt for early retirement. Furthermore, this study underscores the diversity of European 
experiences. Some of this diversity is fairly pronou ced. Despite the fact that European 
employers have some responses in common when dealing with crises, they also demonstrate 
some differences in their reactions. Denmark remains  divergent case, given that Danish 
employers seem to have coped reasonably well with the recession by diverging from the 
instinctive response to send older workers into early retirement. Although it is the case that 
Denmark relies on a set of active labor market policies, the reality is that, despite the image of 
the enlightened and fixed design of ‘flexicurity’, the fundamentals of labor market policies have 
changed over time as experience has been accumulated (Andersen and Svarer (2012)). The 
country specificity of employer behaviors and perceptions are a hardwired element of most labor 
market studies, serving as a silent reminder to policy makers that popular solutions such as 
exporting the Danish model of ‘flexicurity’ to other countries must be met with some skepticism. 
Good or best practices are typically hard to replicate or capture in models, because the tacit 
mechanisms of labor markets and organizations are often lost in translation. 
The finding that fairness matters in labor market decisions may turn out to be of some 
importance because issues of generational fairness ar  becoming more and more prominent in 
the public debate in countries facing soaring youth unemployment rates. In the view of the 
general public the obvious solution would be to send older workers into early retirement (or at 
least to reduce their working hours) in order to pave the way for younger workers to forge their 
own careers. This type of generational fairness resonates with an electorate suffering the 
consequences of high and rising unemployment (see OECD (2006)). Although, this idea of 
reshuffling intergenerational labor denies the hars fact that these types of policies do not work 
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at the macroeconomic level (Munnell and Wu (2012)), many European employers are inclined to 





Appendix: Descriptive statistics for individual countries 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics per country 
Independent variables: 
downsize options 
Netherlands Italy Denmark Sweden Poland Germany 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
 LIFO 2.38 1.10 2.78 1.08 1.93 1.01 2.50 1.21 2.80 0.96 2.73 1.15 
 Balanced age structure 3.20 1.06 2.36 0.89 2.57 1.00 2.93 0.83 2.57 0.86 2.98 1.02 
 Early retirement 3.74 0.93 3.59 0.94 3.01 0.96 3.66 0.93 3.60 0.82 3.66 0.98 
 Buy-outs 3.55 0.97 3.43 1.03 2.94 1.05 3.49 0.99 3.16 0.96 3.23 1.15 
 Short-time work 3.56 0.93 3.55 0.93 3.52 0.90 3.23 1.01 3.22 0.98 3.50 1.13 
 Wage cuts 2.78 1.08 2.36 0.97 2.68 1.12 2.57 1.03 2.70 1.05 3.02 1.13 
Explanatory variables             
Generational fairness 2.64 0.88 3.15 1.08 2.71 0.77 3.10 0.91 2.74 1.06 2.74 0.94 
Perceived strictness of 
EPL 
3.93 0.79 4.46 0.85 2.98 0.93 3.84 0.85 3.37 0.82 4.12 0.88 
Strength of unions 2.57 1.18 3.12 1.29 2.78 1.21 3.25 1.12 2.45 1.33 2.21 1.18 
% Part-timers 0.31 0.27 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.24 
% Highly skilled 0.18 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.20 0.25 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.20 0.24 
% Older workers (50+) 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.32 0.19 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.15 
Size of the organization             
  Small 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.28 0.45 
  Middle 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.36 0.48 
  Large 0.33 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.19 0.39 0.36 0.48 
Sector             
  Manufacturing 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.27 0.44 
  Services sector 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 
  Public sector 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.44 0.47 0.50 
Need to downsize             
  None/hardly 0.63 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.82 0.20 0.72 0.45 
  To some extent 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.38 0.48 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.42 
  To high extent 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.22 
Age respondent 45.64 9.92 45.32 9.45 48.61 8.79 49.21 9.28 42.61 10.04 47.62 9.13 
CEO/owner-director 
(otherwise = 0) 
0.41 0.49 0.09 0.29 0.45 0.50 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.38 0.49 
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